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PART 1: STRUCTURE AND BACKGROUND 
The ninth annual session of the U.S.-China Strategic Dialogue was held in Oahu, Hawaii, from 
September 8-10, 2015. The dialogue is a Track 1.5 meeting; it is formally unofficial but includes 
a mix of government and academic participants. The dialogue is organized by the Naval 
Postgraduate School (NPS) and Pacific Forum CSIS (Center for Strategic and International 
Studies) and funded by the U.S. Defense Threat Reduction Agency’s (DTRA) Project on 
Advanced Systems and Concepts for Countering WMD (PASCC) at NPS. For the fourth time, 
this meeting was also supported by a Chinese co-host, the China Arms Control and Disarmament 
Association (CACDA). This “non-governmental” association, with close ties to the Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs (MFA) and People’s Liberation Army (PLA), helped improve the level and 
quality of participants and secure support for discussing certain topics. 
As the lead agency responsible for addressing threats from weapons of mass destruction (WMD), 
DTRA seeks to enhance American situational awareness of Chinese nuclear strategies and 
capabilities, reduce the prospects for proliferation in Asia and beyond, and more broadly enhance 
American deterrence in a time of transformation. U.S. government interest in this project has 
focused on identifying important misperceptions, misunderstandings, and key divergences in 
national interests, with a goal of reducing these over the long term.  Thus, the goal of this series 
of annual meetings has been to identify important misperceptions regarding each side’s nuclear 
strategy and doctrine and highlight potential areas of cooperation or confidence building 
measures that might reduce such dangers. FOUO and public reports for the previous year’s 
dialogues are available from this report’s authors or the PASCC website. 
In this meeting, participants on the Chinese side included a mix of active and retired senior PLA 
officers, officials from the MFA and Ministry of National Defense (MND), experts from 
government-run civilian Chinese think tanks, and scholars from Chinese universities.  The U.S. 
delegation included participants from government, including Lawrence Livermore National 
Laboratory (LLNL) and National Defense University (NDU); think tanks such as Pacific Forum 
CSIS; and universities such as the University of California–San Diego. It also included observers 
from the State Department, the Joint Staff, USPACOM, USSTRATCOM, Global Strike 
Command, and DTRA, among others. In total, there were more than 25 American participants.  
One of the goals of this series of meetings is to create a community of regular participants who 
develop accumulated learning and the personal trust needed to facilitate a more open discussion. 
This effort met with much success this year in frank, substantive discussions unhindered by 
boilerplate debates and the increasingly tense tenor of the overall bilateral relationship.  
The meeting was organized around four substantive panels, which examined “Recent Changes in 
Strategic Environment and Policy Statements,” “Strategic Stability in the Modern Era,” “Missile 
Defense and Extended Deterrence,” and “Ongoing and Near-term Confidence and Security 
Building Measures.” These topics were developed in coordination with officials on both sides 
before the meeting and the dialogue’s outcomes are routinely outbriefed within both 
governments.  
 
U.S.-China Strategic Dialogue, Phase IX Report | 2 	  
 
PART 2: NARRATIVE ANALYSIS 
General Perceptions of the U.S.-China Relationship 
The general tenor of the meeting was positive and constructive. Throughout the planning phase 
and the dialogue itself, the Chinese delegation displayed strong support for engagement, 
repeatedly emphasizing the value of these bilateral Track 1.5 discussions. This year, for the first 
time, the Chinese side had planned to pay for five participants. Their delegation also expanded to 
include new participants from important organizations this year, including officials from several 
parts of the nuclear weapons community. 
The Chinese side reiterated standard calls for a “new type of major country relations” (新型大国
关系), though they recognized that the United States was unlikely to embrace that concept. One 
Chinese delegate stated that neither side was “experienced” in “addressing differences in either a 
U.S. or Chinese way.” The delegate continued by noting that China is a “participant, contributor, 
and builder” of the international system, “though the system was built without China’s 
involvement.” Nevertheless, China respects U.S. “standing and influence” in the international 
system, and does not wish to replace the system with a Chinese alternative.  
The Chinese delegation implied that the U.S. drive toward hegemony is reflected in its 
dominance of the global order and security architecture. Specifically, the rebalance and the 
deepening of U.S. alliances in the Asia-Pacific are consistent with hegemonic ambitions. These 
alliances in general were a deeper source of concern than in the past, with references made to 
fears of encirclement and a global order that is designed to constrain China. The Chinese 
delegation specifically called out the shift from bilateral to trilateral alliances as worrisome, 
along with India’s Act East policy and its convergence with the U.S.’s rebalance. One delegate 
stated, “China is not trying to elbow the U.S. out of Asia, but the U.S. looks likely to check and 
contain China by utilizing the territorial disputes between China and its littoral neighbors.” The 
delegate further expressed a belief that the 2015 Asia-Pacific Maritime Security Strategy was 
clearly aimed at China, and saw U.S. military deployments to the region as central to the 
rebalance. In contrast to the tenor of other bilateral contemporaneous engagements, U.S. 
“meddling” in the South China Sea was mentioned but not emphasized. 
There seemed to be a new openness to “strategic stability” as traditionally understood in the 
United States (see “The Nuclear Dimension of U.S.-China Relations,” below). There were 
modest restatements of concerns about the modernization of the U.S. nuclear arsenal, with the 
potential development of lower yield—and thus, more useable—warheads called out specifically. 
Military-to-military ties appeared to be an important priority for the delegation. However, 
internal U.S. political divisions were seen to inhibit cooperation and complicate relations. The 
State Department was viewed by Chinese interlocutors as obstructionist on military-to-military 
relations. USPACOM’s and 7th Fleet’s perceptions of China were viewed as divergent and in 
conflict with the White House’s and OSD’s views. The delegation also noted that Congress 
cancelled a visit by a U.S. aircraft carrier to China.   
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China’s Threat Perceptions and Regional Relations  
Broad Threat Perceptions 
Compared to previous years, the Chinese delegation indicated that China sees a new complexity 
in the international security environment. According to one delegate, “peaceful rise” remains 
China’s dominant national strategy, but terms such as “unpredictable future,” “unprecedented,” 
and “complexity” have crept into speeches by Chinese leaders. Nevertheless, China remains in a 
“period of strategic opportunity” for development, and according to the same delegate, the 
general assessment of the global security environment remains almost unchanged. As noted 
earlier, the Chinese delegation was careful to explain that China benefits from the existing global 
order and is not seeking to challenge it. There was a clear desire that all crises, no matter how 
fast moving, should be dealt with through the United Nations Security Council (UNSC). The 
Chinese delegation expressed pessimism regarding the likelihood of limiting nuclear 
proliferation within North Korea and South Asia. On the subject of Iran, however, the delegation 
noted approvingly that the State Department said that China played an important role and that the 
nuclear deal was a win-win result for the nonproliferation system.  
There was a significant, increased emphasis on internal security concerns within China, 
consistent with the National Security Commission (NSC), the wide-ranging July 2015 national 
security law, and the May 2015 White Paper. One delegate noted that internal stability has 
become “more and more prominent” in China’s security assessment and that “color revolutions 
against China” have been highlighted as a security threat. Most strategic risks are seen as internal 
and domestic, rather than external.   
China’s overseas interests were also emphasized by the Chinese delegation as a primary driver of 
Chinese national security assessments and developments. One delegate stated that “energy and 
resources, as well as institutions and persons abroad,” have become an “imminent issue” that is 
“new in China’s security perception.”  Another delegate stated that China is building military 
capabilities to defend its “security, sovereignty, and economic interests,” though others in the 
delegation downplayed the role for the military in this process.   
Regional Alliances and Security Architecture 
As noted earlier, the regional environment remains a challenge, and regional trends are fulfilling 
“China’s anxiety about encirclement by so-called democratic states,” according to one delegate. 
The Chinese delegation expressed concerns about the U.S.’s efforts to strengthen alliances in 
East Asia as well as in the South China Sea. More so than in previous years, they also discussed 
their concerns about North Korea and its impact on regional stability.  
The Chinese delegation also noted that China’s former tolerance of the U.S.’s bilateral alliances 
is waning because these alliances have lead the United States to become more involved in 
maritime disputes. They are also seen as increasingly multilateral and aimed at China. Questions 
were raised about the future of China’s role in Asian security architectures and what the U.S. 
version of an “open and effective” architecture would look like. One delegate suggested that 
China’s perspective on existing regional security arrangements is shifting because China has not 
been “positively incorporated” into what are seen as U.S.-led military alliances. When asked 
about the Conference on Interaction and Confidence Building in Asia (CICA), a delegate noted 
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that this was a continental organization, not maritime, and as such it would not be appropriate to 
admit the United States or Japan. Nevertheless, the Chinese delegation acknowledged that the 
U.S.’s Asian alliances play a positive role in regional stability by preventing the allies from 
developing nuclear weapons. 
Perceptions of Specific States 
North Korea: North Korea was discussed as an opportunity for a constructive cooperation.  
Additional engagement at official channels might prove fruitful if the situation deteriorates there.  
US participants emphasized the importance of an ICBM capability for North Korea.  
 
Japan: Compared to previous years, the Chinese delegation was surprisingly quiet on the topic of 
Japan. Japanese nationalism and militarism was barely mentioned, although Japan is listed as the 
number two threat in the current defense White Paper. Still, one delegate specifically called out 
the U.S.-Japan-Australia alliance as a source of concern for China. 
Taiwan: With the 2016 elections in Taiwan on the horizon, one delegate stated, “Taiwan’s 
independence is the biggest threat to China’s peaceful development. After six or seven years of 
relaxation, the Taiwan issue is reemerging as serious security concern with coming presidential 
election and the prospect of a DPP [Democratic Progressive Party] victory in the election.” 
However, behind the scenes engagement with the DPP is expected to help manage any political 
transition, and signals have been sent that mainland China would engage with “any Taiwan 
authorities that accept the One China policy.” 
Russia: In comparison to previous years, the Chinese delegation seemed to have cooled on 
Russia, and there appear to be new limitations in Sino-Russian relations. There were no implicit 
threats made about using Sino-Russian cooperation to work against U.S. interests, unlike in 
previous years. Nevertheless, China still views Russia as an important world player that must be 
included in decision-making during major crises. 
China’s Security Apparatus Reforms 
There was a brief discussion regarding changes to the PLA and other domestic security bodies. A 
planned reorganization of the PLA was expected to cut uniformed manpower by approximately 
300,000. Some departments within the PLA were expected to shrink, particularly the General 
Armaments and General Logistics Departments. However, the reduction is primarily in non-
combat troops and in the officer corps, with many expected to become civilian PLA employees 
instead. 
On the subject of the NSC, one delegate reemphasized the domestic nature of the body. The 
delegate noted that there is still some uncertainly regarding roles and missions for the NSC, 
stating that there are “piles of social contradictions” in China that require greater attention to 
internal security and stability. Overall, the NSC was judged to be a work in progress intended to 
address shortcomings in decision-making process. 
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The Nuclear Dimensions of U.S.-China Relations 
Chinese Force Posture: “Lean and Effective” 
Maintaining a “lean and effective” nuclear force remains the guiding logic for China’s 
modernization efforts. Nonetheless, some tension was acknowledged this year in how new 
capabilities might affect the balance between lean and effective. For instance, one delegate 
argued that Multiple Independently-Targetable Reentry Vehicles (MIRVs) represented a 
reflection of this challenge, stating that “sometimes lean is not consistent with effective. Maybe 
sometimes lean means ineffective.” Hence, China’s nuclear arsenal modernization may be aimed 
at rectifying this problem through an implied increase in size as well as an emphasis on 
improving effectiveness, reliability, and safety. 
U.S. Ballistic Missile Defense (BMD) was cited as a main reason for Chinese modernization. In 
the words of one delegate, a “firmer shield leads one to develop a sharper spear.” There was 
some discussion about what this might entail beyond quantitative increases, and interesting 
speculation about strategic bargaining and the increased leverage one obtains from a larger 
number of deliverable warheads. 
Chinese Declaratory Policy: No First Use (NFU) 
Just as with force sizing, Chinese messaging on their NFU doctrine remained unchanged this 
year, if relatively muted. This standard messaging was accompanied by the traditional repeated 
calls from Chinese participants that Washington join Beijing in a joint NFU declaration. The 
Chinese side did not expand on what benefits would accrue to the United States beyond 
references to enhanced mutual trust and strategic stability. In reply to Chinese appeals, multiple 
U.S. participants reiterated Washington’s standing policy on nuclear employment as laid out in 
the NPR and related documents.  
Strategic Stability and Evolving Technology 
Unlike in previous meetings, there was a constructive discussion of strategic stability, which was 
characterized in terms that would be recognizable to a Western audience. The Chinese 
participants’ previous reluctance to engage with the concept or terminology because it was a 
Cold War artifact is gone, with no outward rejection of it as a Cold War legacy. There still 
remained a recognition that strategic stability can be seen as embedded in a broader global 
context of interstate relations; one Chinese delegate noted that globalization has contributed to 
the need for strategic stability between the United States and China. The concept of mutual 
vulnerability was raised several times during the meeting.  One Chinese delegate suggested that 
unlike the U.S.-Soviet relationship based in mutually assured destruction, the U.S.-China 
strategic stability is based in mutual vulnerability, even if that has not been explicitly 
acknowledged by the United States.  
There was significant discussion regarding the role of emerging technologies in establishing and 
maintaining strategic stability. There was an interesting discussion regarding MIRVs and 
stability. One line of questioning addressed whether non-mated, MIRVed DF-5s could be 
considered destabilizing: if they were not mated, they would not be any more vulnerable during a 
crisis and thus would not be lost in a first strike and would be available for retaliation.  
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In addition to the discussion about MIRVing, there was more attention drawn to issues of 
competition and potential drivers and dynamics of arms racing by both sides. Questions related 
to the development and expansion of missile defense, improvements in space and cyber 
capabilities, and modernization of nuclear arsenals were raised. These topics would be excellent 
candidates for deeper engagement, along with issues related to colocation of conventional and 
nuclear assets as well as ballistic missile submarine command and control and deployment.  
Extended Deterrence and Assurance 
The Chinese delegation expressed a range of views on the reassurance piece of extended 
deterrence. Some delegates seemed more inclined to accept that missile defense is intended 
primarily for ally reassurance rather than to negate Chinese strategic forces. While some agreed 
that U.S. extended deterrence has more than likely reduced ally demand for nuclear weapons and 
other systems, such as Conventional Prompt Global Strike (CPGS) or an indigenous missile 
defense capability, other delegates argued that extended deterrence undermines nonproliferation 
by creating a camp of states that are not under the U.S. umbrella and that may thus feel 
compelled to develop nuclear weapons for self-defense. 
As in previous meetings, there were questions about whether extended deterrence responses in a 
conventional conflict might include U.S. nuclear use or the use of CPGS. One U.S. delegate 
reiterated the U.S.’s stated policy that it would consider the employment of nuclear weapons 
when the vital interests of the U.S. or an ally were in jeopardy, to include the possibility that the 
U.S. would use nuclear weapons to defend an ally in a war that had otherwise been non-nuclear.  
Chinese Views of Missile Defense 
Views on U.S. Missile Defense 
The deployment and development of a sophisticated U.S. BMD system has been an enduring 
concern for Chinese participants in this dialogue. Their concern is, in part, that once BMD 
technology and its supporting infrastructure are in place, the quantity of interceptors can rapidly 
increase. Thus, even if the U.S. BMD architecture as currently envisaged does not undermine 
China’s nuclear deterrent, the potential for a rapid increase in number of interceptors coupled 
with future changes to U.S. policy fuels Chinese anxiety. In the words of one Chinese delegate, 
the “system itself, rather than current number, is key to the problem.” Just as important, this 
concern leads to warnings that China will be forced to respond by increasing the survivability 
and penetrability of its arsenal. In particular, the delegate suggested that a “firmer shield requires 
a sharper spear,” pointing out that U.S. BMD could stimulate countermeasure work. 
According to multiple Chinese delegates, Beijing is more concerned with U.S. BMD radars than 
the interceptors themselves. Terminal High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) systems, X-band, 
and other detection capabilities are seen as part of a larger system of systems, which include 
early warning, tracking, C2, interception, and evaluation assets. From the Chinese perspective, 
this integrated system could be combined quickly and easily with greater interceptor numbers to 
place China’s second-strike capability in jeopardy, thus increasing the incentive for a U.S. first 
strike. In this situation, U.S. reassurances on interceptor numbers alone are insufficient, even 
more so because many Chinese believe the SM-3 family of missiles to be highly capable.  
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As in the past, recent and prospective deployments of THAAD and X-band systems to the Asia-
Pacific region generated focused ire from the Chinese delegation. These capabilities are seen as 
highly problematic, destabilizing, and not purely aimed at North Korea. Chinese participants did 
recognize that U.S. theater missile defense (TMD) played a role in defending against North 
Korean ballistic missile threats as well as conventional Chinese missiles—a point similarly 
acknowledged by their U.S. counterparts. Despite mutual recognition, however, the Chinese still 
voiced deep concerns about TMD’s strategic implications. Chinese delegates voiced concern that 
THAADs range and detection capabilities exceeded the requirements for the peninsula and 
allowed for surveillance of Chinese missile tests. One delegate also worried that X-band systems 
would be useful for U.S. early warning and response vis-à-vis China, since they could decrease 
the time needed between detection and interceptor launch. With particular reference to North 
Korea, the Chinese side feared that continued BMD deployments would drive quantitative 
increases in North Korean missiles and qualitative improvements in their warhead survivability 
and penetrability. This development, they warned, would raise the chances for the proliferation 
of advanced missile technology from North Korea to other states. 
Views on Chinese Missile Defense 
Chinese discussion of their own BMD advances was limited, but participants added some nuance 
to points made at previous meetings. First, the system was positioned within a wider worldwide 
trend guided by natural technological imperatives to develop BMD. The Chinese pointed to 
research and development in the United States, Russia, and India as primary examples. Secondly, 
Chinese participants argued that their system was useful in helping enhance their understanding 
and development of countermeasures to defeat foreign systems. Some on the Chinese side, one 
delegate also indicated that BMD might be used for “point defense to protect [Chinese] strategic 
forces and enhance survivability.” Furthermore, in response to a question on India, a delegate 
noted that a point defense system would be especially helpful vis-à-vis New Delhi. 
Steps Forward 
Participants on both sides valued the mil-to-mil linkages that had been created over the past few 
years. Specifically, two Chinese delegates believed it unlikely that these ties would be held 
hostage to other issues in the bilateral relationship. Institutionalized and routinized channels were 
held in particularly high regard—hotlines had been used and were viewed positively (more so 
than ones with Russia)—and there seems to be wide-ranging scope for future expansion of mil-
to-mil relations. Nevertheless, both sides expressed some concerns. Some Chinese questioned the 
asymmetric nature and benefits of confidence and security building measures (CSBM) 
notifications. For example, interception protocols were currently only employed near and around 
China. For one delegate, this simply enabled the U.S. military to operate more safely during its 
“deterrence strengthening” operations and close-in encounters with PLA forces. Unsurprisingly, 
multiple delegates pointed to limitations placed on U.S.-China cooperation by the 2000 NDA, 
but they also raised complaints regarding recently published U.S. Air Force regulations that were 
seen to limit mil-to-mil activities. 
In the nuclear arena, prospects for a true Track 1 dialogue on strategic issues still seemed far off. 
While neither side evinced much enthusiasm for a meeting soon, U.S. and Chinese participants 
did discuss who should be in the room and what topics might be considered. For example, one 
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U.S. participant noted that a Track 1 would require greater specificity from the Chinese in order 
to ascertain what the technical parameters of stability in the nuclear relationship might be. One 
Chinese participant recommended a mutual reassurance agreement in which the United States 
pledged to maintain the credibility of China’s second strike while China pledged to keep its 
arsenal small. Given this preliminary conversation, it seems worthwhile to begin crafting a 
prospective agenda and determining the topics and parameters for discussion, such as what the 
U.S. might wish to request in terms of transparency on warhead numbers. Both sides might also 
consider ruling out topics and deciding which Track 1 entities should be in the room for a 
meeting. Additionally, the Chinese side seemed to accept the possibility of using existing 
bilateral forums to discuss nuclear issues in more depth, rather than creating new mechanisms. 
A specific suggestion viewed positively by both delegations involved each side selecting a 
CSBM to discuss at the Track 1 level. The Chinese would be likely to request an official 
discussion of the merits and potential for a joint NFU declaration. Suggestions for the U.S.-
backed discussion ranged from a joint technical assessment of U.S. BMD capabilities to a joint 
threat analysis of North Korea’s ballistic missile threat.  
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PART 3: MEETING AGENDA  
Sept 9 
0815-0845  Welcome Remarks: Outlining Common Strategic Interests 
 
0845-1015  Recent Changes in Strategic Environment and Policy Statements  
What are American and Chinese perceptions of recent developments in the 
regional and global strategic environment? Chinese policy documents continue to 
increase the depth of discussion on its strategic policy with the publication of 
China’s Military Strategy in May 2015 and the 2013 version of the Science of 
Strategy/战略学. The National Security Outline has also been finalized and 
discussed in the Chinese press.  U.S. policy continues to be promulgated through 
documents such as the 2015 National Military Strategy and National Security 
Strategy and the 2014 Quadrennial Defense Review.  What new can be learned 
from these recent statements?  What threats or developments in international 
security environment are these military policies (of both countries) trying to 
respond to and how do they do so? 
 
1015-1030  Break 
 
1030-1230  Strategic Stability in the Modern Era 
The two sides have discussed strategic stability at the track 2 level and are starting 
to do so at the track 1 level.  What areas of mutual understanding have the two 
sides developed?  What are the major areas of differing views? How does each 
side envision its military modernization enhancing strategic stability? What can 
each side do (or refrain from doing) that would enhance it? 
 




1015-1230  Missile Defense and Extended Deterrence 
In past discussions, it is clear that missile defense capabilities raise both regional 
issues as well as issue in the global bilateral relationship.  How does each side see 
missile defense as contributing to their own national defense?  How does each 
side see missile defense supporting (or affecting) extended deterrence in Asia?  
Are there prospects for mutual accommodation of diverging views on this issue? 
  
1230-1330  Lunch 
 
1330-1500  Ongoing and Near-term Confidence and Security Building Measures 
What are each side’s views on the utility of the current military CSBMs being 
implemented in the wake of the Sunnylands summit of 2013?  How can progress 
in this regard be extended to the strategic realm?  
 
1500-1530  Implications and Ways Forward 
